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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 28, 2015, the owner of the Boston Bruins, Jeremy Jacobs,
and his wife, Margaret Jacobs (collectively the “Boston Bruins”), were
issued a Notice of Deficiency from the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”).1 Deeridge Farms Hockey Association, an S Corporation that
Jeremy and Margaret are the “sole shareholders of,” “operates the Boston
Bruins.”2 In the Notice of Deficiency, the IRS claimed that the Boston
Bruins owe $45,205.00 for the 2009 tax year and $39,823.00 for the 2010
tax year.3 Three months after receiving the Notice of Deficiency, the
Boston Bruins filed a petition with the United States Tax Court
challenging the IRS’s determination of deficiency.4
The issue between the IRS and the Boston Bruins involves
deductions that the team took for meal expenses.5 Specifically, the IRS
claims that the meal expenses, which the team incurred by providing its
players with meals during away games, are capped at fifty percent of the
amount spent according to Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Tax Code”
or “Code”) Section 274(n).6 The Boston Bruins argue that the away game
meal expenses are governed by Section 274(n)(2), which provides that
the fifty percent limitation “does not apply in some circumstances,
including when the meal expense is excludible as gross income of the
recipient under the de minimis fringe rules of Section 132.”7
The faceoff between the IRS and the Boston Bruins will require the
court to address issues that have “remained unresolved for many years”
Br. for Pet’r at 1, Jacobs v. Comm’r., No. 19009-15 (T.C. July 27, 2015); see also
Boston Bruins Owners’ Seek Redetermination of Tax Deficiencies, TAX NOTES TODAY 16113 (Aug. 20, 2015) (Lexis).
2
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5.
3
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 2.
4
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; see also Callum Borchers, Bruins, IRS in Face-Off on
Deducting Team Meals, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe
.com/business/2015/08/17/bruins-appeal-for-irs-approval-deduct-cost-feeding-team-duringroad-trips/IgfStOf0wBhWGtHr82aVjO/story.html.
5
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; see also Bruins in Tax Battle with IRS Over Comped
Meals, FOX SPORTS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www.foxsports.com/nhl/story/irs-boston-bruinstax-meal-write-offs-081815.
6
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; Roger Russell, Boston Bruins Battle IRS Over Meal
Deductions, ACCT. TODAY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/taxpractice/boston-bruins-battle-irs-over-meal-deductions-75542-1.html.
7
Andrew Velarde, News Analysis: Are the Bruins About to Hip-Check the IRS on Meal
Expenses?, TAX NOTES TODAY 165-2 (Aug. 25, 2015) (Lexis); accord Br. for Pet’r, supra
note 1, at 9; see also 26 I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B) (2016) (stating that the fifty percent cap does
not apply if “in the case of an expense for food or beverages, such expense is excludable from
the gross income of the recipient under section 132 by reason of subsection (e) thereof
(relating to de minimis fringes) . . . “).
1
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and could have a significant impact on businesses across the country.8 A
favorable ruling for the Boston Bruins would be used as precedent by the
“30 NHL teams and 30 NBA teams traveling for 41 games each season,
32 NFL teams traveling eight times a season, and 30 MLB teams
traveling for 81 games each year.”9 It would also affect employees of
“mobile employers” who have not been deducting 100 percent of their
meal expenses.10 Furthermore, if the court decides in favor of the Boston
Bruins, then the IRS could lose millions of dollars in tax revenue.11
This note will take the position that the Boston Bruins are correct in
deducting 100 percent of the meal expenses incurred during away games.
Part II of this note will provide a comprehensive road map. This road
map will highlight the relevant parts of the Tax Code that are applicable
to the Boston Bruins argument and give insight into how these parts of
the Tax Code function together. Part III of this note will discuss what
constitutes necessary and ordinary business expenses pursuant to Section
162, and what must be shown by the taxpayer to meet the requirements
of Section 162(a)(2) of the Code. The first part of this section will apply
the standards provided in Section 162 to the Boston Bruins’ case. The
next section of Part III will provide an in-depth exploration of Section
274, which limits or denies Section 162 deductions for meals under
certain circumstances. During the discussion of the relevant elements of
Section 274, this note will apply them to the present dispute between the
Boston Bruins and the IRS. Section 274, however, incorporates elements
defined in other sections of the Tax Code, particularly Sections 132 and
119. These two sections of the Code will be discussed in Part IV. The
first section of Part IV will examine the definition of “meal” and “eating
facility” in Section 132(e). The second section of Part IV will present
and analyze the historical background of Section 119, which provides an
exclusion for the value of food provided to employees for the
convenience of the employer on its business premises. In the final
segment of this note, Part V, will conclude that although the Boston
Bruins face an uphill battle in their challenge of the IRS’s position, the
team should ultimately be successful in their stated position. Part V will
also discuss the ramifications if the Boston Bruins are successful in their
faceoff with the IRS.

8

Velarde, supra note 7.
Velarde, supra note 7.
10
Velarde, supra note 7 (stating that an example of an “mobile employer” would be a
concert promoter who has a “group of mobile employees” that move from “venue to venue”
promoting concerts).
11
Velarde, supra note 7.
9
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II. THE GAME PLAN
A. Tax Code Road Map
The Tax Code “prescribes a complex and not-always-intuitive
formula for navigating” the area of employer-provided meals.12 In order
to decipher the argument asserted by the Boston Bruins and the relevant
issues, it is important to understand how all of the applicable sections of
the Tax Code work together. To begin, Section 162(a) of the Tax Code
allows for a taxpayer to deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business.”13 Section 162 explicitly treats “travel expenses (including
amounts expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are
lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while away from home in
the pursuit of a trade or business” as ordinary and necessary business
expenses.14
Deductions for meals are, however, limited or denied in certain
circumstances by Section 274, which applies once the elements of
Section 162 are met. Section 274(a)(1) disallows deductions “otherwise
allowable under this chapter for any item” or activity that constitutes
“entertainment, amusement, or recreation.”15 The section also applies to
a “facility” that is used “in connection with an activity” that constitutes
entertainment, amusement, or recreation.16 Though it is not clear on the
face of Section 274 that meals are considered “entertainment,
amusement, or recreation” the legislative history clearly indicates that it
“includes any business expense incurred in furnishing of food and
beverage.”17 There are, however, exceptions to the disallowance for
“entertainment, amusement, or recreation” expenses. The disallowance
is not applicable if “the item was directly related to, or, in the case of an
item directly preceding or following a substantial bona fide business
discussion . . . associated with, the active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade
or business.”18
The disallowance is also inapplicable in nine
circumstances enumerated in Section 274(e) of the Tax Code.19 The two
12
Syd Gernstein, Boston Bruins Raise Controversy by Arguing that Meals are
Deductible, Team is “World-Class,” BNA FED. TAX BLOG (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.bna.com
/boston-bruins-raise-b17179934636/.
13
26 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2016).
14
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).
15
I.R.C. § 274(a)(1) (2016).
16
I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(B).
17
S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 27 (1962).
18
26 I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A) (2016).
19
I.R.C. § 274(e).

ADAM SUCKNO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

I.R.S. v. BOSTON BRUINS

8/30/2017 12:18 PM

211

most pertinent exceptions under Section 274(e) with respect to the Boston
Bruins are the exceptions for “food and beverages for employees” and
“employees, stockholder, etc., business meetings.”20 Even if one of the
exceptions applies, expenses for business meals are often limited by
Section 274(n) to fifty percent of the expense.21 The fifty percent
limitation is not applicable if the “expense is excludable from the gross
income of the recipient under Section 132 by reason of subsection (e)
thereof (relating to de minimis fringes).”22
Section 132 treats an eating facility as a de minimis fringe—a fringe
benefit of such small value that it is excluded from taxation—if the
employer operates the eating facility for the employees, the facility is
“located on or near the business premises of the employer,” and the
“revenue derived from such facility normally equals or exceeds the direct
operating costs of such facility.”23 The requirement under Section 132
that the revenue from the facility equals or exceeds the direct operating
expenses is satisfied if the employees are permitted to exclude the value
of the meal under Section 119. Pursuant to Section 119, an employee
may exclude from his gross income “the value of any meals or lodging
furnished to him . . . on behalf of his employer” if the meals are provided
for the convenience of the employer and “are furnished on the business
premises of the employer.”24
III. SCORING DEDUCTIONS
A. Section 162: Ordinary and Necessary
Before the Boston Bruins can assert that the away game meal
expenses they incurred are 100 percent deductible under Section 274, the
team must first meet the requirements of Section 162. Section 162(a)
allows for deductions of ordinary and necessary trade or business
expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business.25 The courts, in lieu
of offering a bright-line test for determining whether a business expense
is necessary and ordinary, have offered an objective standard in which to
20
I.R.C. § 274(e)(1) (“Subsection (a) shall not apply to—[e]xpenses for food and
beverages (and facilities used in connection therewith) furnished on the premises of the
taxpayer primarily for his employees.”).
21
I.R.C. § 274(n) (stating in part that the deduction “shall not exceed 50 percent” for
“any expense for food and beverages, and any item with respect to an activity which is of a
type generally considered to constitute entertainment, amusement, or recreation, or with
respect to a facility used in connection with such activity”).
22
I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B).
23
26 I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (2016).
24
26 I.R.C. § 119(a)(1)-(2) (2016).
25
I.R.C. § 162(a).
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assess the nature of the expense.26 This test looks at whether a “hardheaded businessman” would have incurred the same expense in an
analogous situation.27
The determination of whether a trade or business expense is ordinary
will depend upon the “time and place and circumstances” in which the
expense was incurred.28 Moreover, in Deputy v. Du Pont, the Supreme
Court concluded that the “nature and scope” of the business is “extremely
relevant” in determining whether an expense is ordinary.” 29
The Boston Bruins will be able to establish that meals provided to
its players during away games are ordinary expenses under Section
162(a). Each season the team plays numerous games away from Boston:
forty-one regular season games, four preseason games, and potentially
several away playoff games.30 In order for these players to adequately
perform and serve their employer’s business purpose, the players need to
be provided proper food and beverages before the game.31 Without
proper nutrition, the team risks its players encountering “glycogen
depletion, hypoglycemia, and fatigue during exercise.”32 Considering the
nature and scope of the Boston Bruins’ business—”playing and winning
professional hockey games”—it is highly probable that the court will find
no issue with classifying the away game meal expenses as ordinary. 33
For an expense to be classified as necessary under Section 162(a),
the expense must be found to be “appropriate and helpful” and incurred
with the intention of securing a business benefit.34 In the Boston Bruins’

26

United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (stating that the Supreme Court focused on
the “origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred . . . “ in
deciding that legal fees that were incurred in a divorce action were not deductible).
27
General Bancshares Corp. v. Comm’r, 326 F.2d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1964); see also
Rittenberg v. U.S., 267 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1959).
28
Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 496 (1940) (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111, 113-14 (1933)).
29
Id. (“The fact that an obligation to pay has arisen is not sufficient. It is the kind of
transaction out of which the obligation arose and its normalcy in the particular business which
are crucial and controlling.”); see also Larrabee v. Comm’r., 33 T.C. 838, 843 (1960) (finding
that the petitioners were not allowed to deduct the operating expenses of a yacht because there
was a lack of proximate relationship between the expense and the business operations of the
petitioners).
30
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5.
31
See Fueling for Performance: How Proper Timing of Meals Affects Both Sport and
Academic Performance, NCAA (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/health-andsafety/nutrition-and-performance/fueling-performance-how-proper-timing-meals-affectsboth.
32
Id.
33
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7.
34
Boyd v. Comm’r., 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1253, at *2 (2002) (citing Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)); Heigerick v. Comm’r., 45 T.C. 475, 478 (1966).
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case, the team meets both requirements for the expense to be considered
necessary under Section 162(a). The Boston Bruins engage in the
business of being “a world-class hockey team that provides entertainment
to hockey fans who watch the Bruins’ games,” entertainment which is
sold to the fans “as part of a bona fide transaction.”35 Furthermore, the
team’s entertainment goals, including their “ultimate purpose of playing,
and winning, professional hockey games,” can only be accomplished by
providing the players’ necessary meals.36
In sports, especially
professional sports, “adequate nutrition is absolutely essential for optimal
training and performance of the athlete.”37 These “carefully selected”
meals that “meet specific nutritional guidelines” can optimize
“performance consistency in competition” and “reduce[] risk of injury”
to the athletes.38 Thus, the Bruins will have no issue proving that the
away game meals qualify as necessary for the purposes of Section 162(a).
Although the Bruins meet the necessary and ordinary test, the team
may also be able to deduct its meal expenses under Section 162(a)(2).39
To come within the purview of Section 162(a)(2), the taxpayer must clear
three hurdles.40 Specifically, the taxpayer must establish the expense
was: (1) “reasonable and necessary,” (2) “incurred while away from
home,” and (3) “incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business.”41
The first prong will be met if the travel expenses are solely for
business, and “reasonable and necessary.”42 This includes “meals and
lodging,” “travel fare,” and other “expenses incident to travel.”43
Moreover, the determination of whether a trip is “related primarily to the
taxpayer’s trade or business” will depend on the “facts and circumstances
in each case.”44
As to the second prong, the IRS and the courts have decided that the

Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7.
37
Katherine A. Beals & Anna Mitchell, Recent Recommendations and Current
Controversies in Sport Nutrition, 9 AM. J. LIFESTYLE MED. 288, 288 (2013).
38
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8; Beals & Mitchell, supra note 37, at 288.
39
26 I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (2016) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, including—(2) traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and
lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances) while
away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . .”).
40
Daly v. Comm’r., 72 T.C. 190, 194 (1979) (citing Comm’r. v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465,
470 (1946)); I.R.C. § 162(a).
41
Daly, 72 T.C. at 194.
42
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(a) (2016).
43
Id.
44
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b)(2).
35
36
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taxpayer must meet the “overnight rule.”45 This requires the taxpayer to
show that the trip (1) “requir[ed] sleep or rest,” (2) the sleep or rest “was
substantial in time,” and (3) the trip was away from home.46
Finally, the last requirement is that the expense be “incurred in the
pursuit of a trade or business.”47 Whether this element is met requires the
court to examine the facts and circumstances of each case.48
The Boston Bruins will be able to meet the aforementioned test for
the deduction of business expenses under Section 162(a)(2) of the Code.
As to the first prong, the Boston Bruins incurred the meal expenses at
hotels solely because of the business the team is involved in.49 The team
would not be able to function if it did not travel for its games because
failure to attend away games would cause the Boston Bruins to miss half
of its games.50 Thus, the team traveling to an away game is solely for
business reasons.
Turning to the second prong of Section 162(a)(2), the taxpayer needs
to meet the overnight rule by showing that he is away from his principal
place of business. The team meets the overnight rule because “the players
are required to sleep at the designated hotel and abide by a designated
curfew.”51 The team will also be able to establish that Boston is the
principal location of the business pursuant to the factors provided by the
IRS.52 The fact that the team plays half of its games at its home arena
and that the corporate headquarters is located at the home arena is enough
for the Boston Bruins to show that Boston is the team’s principal business
location.53 This conclusion is further supported by the fact that when the
45
Chappie v. Comm’r., 73 T.C. 823, 830 (1980) (“It is well settled that ‘away from
home’ includes only overnight trips or trips which a stop for sleep or rest is required.” (citing
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967))).
46
Id.; Siragusa v. Comm’r., 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1196, at 11-12 (1980) (stating that rest
or sleep is substantial in time if it requires the taxpayer to secure lodging and is not “a mere
pause in the daily work”); Rev. Rul. 75-432, 1975-2 C.B. 60 (stating that the term “home”
has been defined by the IRS as the “place at which the taxpayer conducts the trade or
business”); see generally Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51 (The IRS has provided factors
that should be considered when determining if the location is the taxpayer’s principal place
of business, which are: (1) “total time ordinarily spent by the taxpayer at each of his business
posts,” (2) “the degree of business activity at each such post,” and (3) “whether the financial
return in respect of each post is significant or insignificant.”).
47
Daly, 72 T.C. 190 at 194.
48
Higgins v. Comm’r, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
49
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
50
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5.
51
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
52
Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51.
53
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5; BOSTON BRUINS, http://bruins.nhl.com/club/
page.htm?id=38742 (last accessed Oct. 30, 2016) (stating the Boston Bruins’ home arena is
TD Garden in Boston).
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court and the IRS were faced with a situation where an athlete was trying
to deduct his expenses under Section 162(a)(2), both the IRS and court
found that the “tax home of the athlete was the principal place of his
employment or business (i.e., the city where his team is located).” 54 If
the athlete’s principal place of business is the city of the team in which
he plays for, then it would seem likely that the team’s principal place of
business is the city where it is located—Boston in this case.
The last requirement that needs to be met by a taxpayer under
Section 162(a)(2) is that the expense was incurred in the pursuit of a trade
or business. This will be satisfied by the fact that the only reason the
team is traveling and incurring meal expenses is because it has to play
against another team, which is an essential element of its business of
providing hockey entertainment to fans of the sport.55
B. Section 274
i. Historical Overview
In the early 1960s, prior to the implementation of Section 274,
Congress became concerned about abusive deductions for meals and
entertainment.56
In 1961, President Kennedy suggested to Congress that “business
entertainment and the maintenance of entertainment facilities” be
disallowed entirely as tax deductions, and that “restrictions should be
imposed on the deductibility of business gifts and travel expenses.”57
Congress did not think that a complete disallowance in all circumstances
was the proper solution.58 Rather, it added a complex provision to IRC
Section 274, which disallows deductions for meals in certain
circumstances, limits the deductions to fifty percent in most cases, and
allows deductions without limitation in other cases.59 The IRS maintains
that the fifty percent limitation applies to the Boston Bruins. 60 The team
54
Bailey v. Comm’r., 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 141, at 5, 9 (1984) (The taxpayer was a hockey
player who played in St. Louis in 1973 and was traded to Detroit in 1974. The Court held
that the player’s tax home was “Detroit and St. Louis, respectively, during the periods of time
petitioner resided in those cities.”); see also Wills v. Comm’r., 411 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir.
1969) (holding the athlete’s tax home was Los Angeles during the time he played for the Los
Angeles Dodgers); see generally Rev. Rul. 54-147, 1954-1 C.B. 51.
55
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 5.
56
MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 133
(12th ed. 2012); see also S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 25 (1962).
57
H.R. REP. NO. 82-1447, at 19 (1962).
58
S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 25 (1962).
59
26 I.R.C. § 274 (2016); I.R.S. Publication 463, Travel, Entertainment, Gift and Car
Expenses, at 11-12, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p463.pdf.
60
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; Roger Russell, Boston Bruins Battle IRS Over Meal
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claims that the expenses are fully deductible.61
ii. Analysis and Application of Section 274
The provisions of Section 274 are of “stupefying complexity.” 62
Section 274(a) generally disallows a deduction for any expenses incurred
by the taxpayer which constitute “entertainment, amusement, or
recreation” unless such expense is “directly related to” or “associated
with” the “active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade or business . . . .”63
Alternatively, if the taxpayer cannot satisfy the “associated with” or the
“directly related” tests of Section 274(a), then the taxpayer may be able
to show that his business expenses fall under one of the nine exceptions
enumerated in Section 274(e).64 Even if a taxpayer meets the directly
related or associated with tests of Section 274(a), or if the taxpayer’s
situation falls under one of the exceptions provided in 274(e), Section
274(n) caps the expense deductible by a taxpayer for meals and
entertainment at fifty percent of the cost of the expense.65 This fifty
percent limitation applies unless the meal or entertainment expense falls
under one of the five exceptions listed under Section 274(n)(2).66
IRC Section 274, which deals with “entertainment, amusement, or
recreation,” might not seem applicable to meals provided by the Boston
Bruins to players and staff while on the road, but the Senate Report
explicitly states that entertainment “includes any business expense
incurred in furnishing of food and beverages.”67 The General
Explanation of the provision prepared by the staff of the Committee on
Taxation states that “allowable deductions for business meals[] includ[e]
meals while on a business trip away from home, meals furnished on the
employer’s business premises to its employees, and meal expense at a
business luncheon club or a convention . . . .”68 Courts have uniformly
read Section 274 to apply to all business meals.69 Treasury Regulations
Deductions, ACCT. TODAY (Sept. 25, 2016), http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/
tax-practice/boston-bruins-battle-irs-over-meal-deductions-75542-1.html.
61
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9.
62
DANIEL Q. POSIN & DONALD B. TOBIN, PRINCIPLE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 400 (7th ed. 2005).
63
26 I.R.C. § 274(a) (2016).
64
I.R.C. § 274(a), (e).
65
I.R.C. § 274(n).
66
I.R.C. § 274(n)(2).
67
I.R.C. § 274(a)(1)(A); S. REP. NO. 87-1881, at 27 (1962).
68
STAFF OF THE COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 61 (Comm. Print 1987) available at http://www.jct.gov/jcs-1087.pdf.
69
Howard v. Comm’r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1554 (1981) (“We find that the deduction [for
the luncheon] is not disallowed by section 274(a) because it falls within the exception to that
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(“Regulations”) indicate that IRC Section 274 applies to meals provided
to employees.70
IRC Section 274(a) establishes two different tests that a taxpayer can
meet for the expense to be deductible: the “associated with” and the
“directly related” tests, which require the taxpayer to go beyond the
necessary and ordinary requirements of Section 162.71 These tests
require a taxpayer to show a “greater degree of proximate relation”
between his business and the expense.72 However, the taxpayer need only
meet one of these tests.73
a. Directly Related Tests (“Active Business
Discussion” and “Clear Business Setting” Tests)
Under the directly related test, an expense will be considered
“directly related to the active conduct of the taxpayer’s trade of business”
if the taxpayer can meet one of the four tests provided by the Treasury
Regulations.74 Only two of these four tests will be discussed—the “active
business discussion” test and the “clear business setting” test.75 The two
other tests enumerated under the directly related test have no application
to the issues raised by the Boston Bruins.76 Moreover, from the facts
asserted in the Boston Bruins’ brief, the team will be able to meet either
the active business discussion or the clear business setting test in order to
satisfy the directly related test under IRC Section 274(a)77

section contained in section 274(e)(1) for business meals furnished under circumstances
conducive to business discussions.”); Baltran v. Comm’r, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 892 (1982) (“The
deductions we have allowed qualify for the most part as business meals under section
274(e)(1), and we are therefore exempt from the limitations on deductibility contained in
section 274(a).”); Lennon v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 751 (1978) (“Section 274(e)
specifically provides that section 274(a) does not apply to ‘business meals.’ Instead, section
274(e) provides that if the taxpayer can establish that a ‘business meal’ was furnished in
surroundings generally conducive to a business discussion, the taxpayer need not establish
that the meal was ‘directly related’ to the conduct of his trade or business.”).
70
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(ii) (2016).
71
26 I.R.C. § 274(a) (2016).
72
Daniel Candee Knickerbocker, Jr., Entertainment and Related Deductions Under the
Revenue Act of 1962, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 639, 642 (1963).
73
See POSIN &. TOBIN, supra note 62, at 402 (“[T]he taxpayer establishes that the item
was directly related to—or . . . associated with—the active conduct of a taxpayer’s trade or
business.”) (emphasis added).
74
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(2).
75
See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(5) (2016) (discussing the treatment of entertainment
expenses when the expense benefits an individual, who is not an employee); see also Treas.
Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(6) (elaborating on the furnishing of food and beverages, which were
incurred prior to 1994).
76
See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(5)-(6).
77
See Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1.
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1. Active Business Discussion
There are four requirements that must be demonstrated in order to
meet the active business discussion test, which in turn means the taxpayer
will meet the directly related test.78 First, when the taxpayer made “the
entertainment expenditure . . . , the taxpayer had more than a general
expectation of deriving some income or other specific trade or business
benefit at some indefinite future time.”79 With respect to the Boston
Bruins, the team had more than a general expectation of deriving both a
benefit and income from the expenditure for pre-game meals. The
success of the Boston Bruins’ business is completely dependent on the
performance of the players; thus, it is important that these players are
provided the proper nutrition.80 The benefit that the Bruins receive from
the two meals provided to players on game days is twofold. First, the
pre-game meals allow the team to “control the players’ movement up
until game time,” and they allow coaches and the press to speak to the
players during the meals.81 Second, the pre-game meals “are carefully
selected by the club’s professional medical staff to meet specific nutrition
guidelines.”82 These meals are “heavy on carbohydrates and come in
large portions, and the team dictates exactly what proteins, fruits, and
vegetables must be available.”83 Therefore, it is evident that the Boston
Bruins have more than a general expectation of deriving both a benefit
and income from the meal expense—it is absolutely essential that their
players are provided food with high nutritional value to ensure the
success of the Boston Bruins’ business.
Second, it must be shown that during the time the expense was
incurred, “the taxpayer actively engaged in a business meeting,
negotiation, discussion, or bona fide business transaction, other than
entertainment, for the purpose of obtaining” a business benefit or
78

Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3).
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(i) (stating that there is no requirement that the taxpayer
show that every expense resulted in income or a business benefit).
80
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 9; see generally Helen DeMarco, Pre-Event Meals, AM.
COLL. OF SPORTS MED., https://www.acsm.org/docs/current-comments/preevent
meals.pdf (last accessed Oct. 31, 2016) (“It is well established that exercise performance can
be affected by diet and, in order to maintain optimal training, the body must be properly
refueled with appropriate nutrients.”).
81
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
82
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
83
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8. Cf. Helen DeMarco, Pre-Event Meals, AM. COLL. OF
SPORTS MED., http://www.acsm.org/docs/current-comments/preeventmeals.pdf (last accessed
Oct. 31, 2016) (Proper meals, especially those that are high in carbohydrates, are essential to
preventing athletes from experiencing “weakness and fatigue . . . , ward off feelings of hunger
yet minimize gastrointestinal distress from eating . . . , guarantee optimal hydration”, and
“delay fatigue.”).
79
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income.84 It is undisputed that the Boston Bruins can meet this prong
because during these meals “coaches and press staff speak with players
individually to prepare them for the upcoming game, an interview with
the media, or some similar event.”85
The third prong under the active business discussion test looks at the
facts and circumstances of the expenditure and determines if the principal
character of the “combined business and entertainment” expense was the
active conduct of the taxpayer’s business.86 The facts of the Boston
Bruins case unambiguously demonstrate that these pre-game meals had
the principal characteristic of being for a business purpose; the meals
provide the players with proper nutrition prior to the game and an
opportunity for players to speak with coaches and the media.87 Moreover,
the meals serve to protect the Boston Bruins’ business interest of
providing entertainment to fans by allowing the team to “control the
players’ movement and conduct up until the game.”88
The fourth and final condition that needs to be met under the active
business discussion test is the disallowance of nonbusiness guests. 89 In
essence, the expenditure must be allocable at the time it was incurred to
the “taxpayer and a person with whom the taxpayer engaged in the active
conduct of trade or business during the entertainment.”90 The pre-game
meals furnished to the players are exclusively available to the “club’s
entire hockey operation staff.” 91 This hockey operation staff consists of
“twenty-two hockey players plus the general manager, various coaches,
medical trainers, equipment managers, public relations staff, and logistic
managers.”92 As a result, the meal expenses are directly attributable to
the team and its essential operation staff. Thus, the active business
84
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(ii) (2016); see D.A. Foster Trenching Co. v. United States,
473 F.2d 1398, 1403 (1973) (stating that during the business meeting or bona fide business
transaction the taxpayer or a representative of the taxpayer, such as the taxpayer’s employee,
must be present when the expense occurs).
85
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
86
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(iii); see generally Townsend Indus. v. United States, 342
F.3d 890, 891 (8th Cir. 2003). A company had its sales people attend a “two-day meeting at
its headquarters,” which involved “corporate staff and some factory workers.” After this
meeting the company sponsored a fishing trip that lasted four days, during which the CEO
spoke about the company and the employees and sales people were free to do whatever they
pleased. The Court held that the third prong was met because this trip enabled the company
to introduce new products and for “the national sales team to interact with the” manufacturing
employees of the company. Id.
87
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
88
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
89
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(3)(iv) (2016).
90
Id.
91
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
92
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
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discussion test is satisfied.
2. Clear Business Setting
The second test available to a taxpayer under the directly related test
is the clear business setting test.93 An entertainment expense will be
considered directly related to the taxpayer’s trade or business if the
taxpayer can establish that the expense occurred “in a clear business
setting directly in further[ance] of the taxpayer’s trade or business.”94
This can be established by the taxpayer demonstrating that “any recipient
of the entertainment would have reasonably known that the taxpayer had
no significant motive, in incurring the expenditure, other than directly
furthering his trade or business,” which is determined by objective
standards.95
The Boston Bruins will be able to establish that the meal expenses
occurred in a clear business setting. The team will be able to demonstrate
that the players reasonably knew that the team was incurring the meal
expenses in order to further the team’s business objectives. For example,
the meals are specifically chosen with the intent of enhancing the players’
performance; the players must meet with coaches and the press during
the meals, and the meals ensure that the team has control over the players
prior to the game.96 These aforementioned examples would lead a
reasonable player to believe that the meals were provided to further the
team’s business.
b. “Associated With” Test
The second test under 274(a) is the associated with test.97 This test
requires that a taxpayer have “a clear business purpose in making the
expenditure, such as to obtain new business or to encourage the
continuation of an existing business relationship,” and that the
“entertainment directly preceded or followed a substantial and bona fide
business discussion.”98 The test operates with the intent of allowing
deductions for business entertainment expenses “incurred primarily for
the purpose of fostering goodwill.”99 However, this test is not applicable
to the Boston Bruins’ case because the meal expenses that the team incurs
are directly related to the Boston Bruins’ business.
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(c)(4) (2016).
Id.
Id.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d).
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(d)(1), (2).
6 MERTENS, LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX’N § 25D.27 (2016).
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c. 274(e) Exceptions
Although the Boston Bruins meet the directly related test under
Section 274(a), meeting this test may not be necessary because of the
exceptions listed in 274(e). IRC Section 274(e) lists nine situations that
allow a taxpayer to bypass the associated with and directly related tests
of Section 274(a).100 Two of these exceptions are directly applicable to
the Boston Bruins: Section 274(e)(1) (food and beverages for employees)
and Section 274(e)(5) (employees, stockholder, etc., business
meetings).101 Pursuant to Section 274(e)(1), expenses incurred for food
and beverages “furnished on the taxpayer’s business premises primarily
for his employees” will be exempted from the “directly related” test.102
This expectation will apply not only when the expense is incurred for
furnishing food and beverages to the employees “in a typical cafeteria or
an executive dining room, but also to expenditures with respect to the
operation of those facilities.”103 Applying this exception to the Boston
Bruins creates a major issue: whether the away game hotels, where the
meals are provided, constitute the business premises of the Boston
Bruins. What constitutes the business premises of the employer will be
addressed in section IV of this note.104
Despite the fact that the Boston Bruins are able to satisfy either the
directly related test under Section 274(a) or establish that their
circumstances fall under one of the exceptions enumerated in Section
274(e), the team may still be restricted to only deducting fifty percent of
the total meal costs incurred. Under Section 274(n), any food or beverage
expense incurred by the taxpayer will be deductible only up to fifty
percent of the cost for the food or beverage, unless an exception
applies.105 Section 274(n)(2) states that the fifty percent cap on food and
beverage costs “shall not apply to any expense if” the expense for food
and beverages is “excludable from the gross income of the recipient under
Section 132 by reason of subsection (e) thereof (relating to de minimis
100

26 I.R.C. § 274(e) (2016).
I.R.C. § 274(e)(1), (5); Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(vi) (Section 274(e)(5) allows for
“any expenditure by a taxpayer for entertainment which is directly related to bona fide
business meetings of the taxpayer’s employees, stockholders, agents, or directors held
principally for discussion of trade or business . . . .”); MERTENS, supra note 99, § 25D.31
(stating that the 274(e)(5) exception “applies to business meeting where some social activities
are provided, it is not intended to apply to gatherings which are primary for social
purposes . . .”). But see 26 I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(A) (2016). The 274(e)(5) exception will not
help the Boston Bruins, because it is still subject to the fifty percent limitation of 274(n). Id.
102
Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2(f)(2)(ii).
103
MERTENS, supra note 99, § 25D.31.
104
See infra Part IV.B.2.ii (discussing the meaning of business premise under IRC
Section 119).
105
26 I.R.C. § 274(n) (2016).
101
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fringes).”106 The requirements that need to be satisfied in order for a cost
to be a de minimis fringe benefit and thus fall under the exception to the
fifty percent cap will be discussed in the following section.
IV. THE FACEOFF
A. Section 132
Section 132(a) provides, “Gross income shall not include any fringe
benefit which qualifies as a . . . de minimis fringe.”107 An employeroperated eating facility will “be treated as de minimis if—(A) such
facility is located on or near the business premises of the employer, and
(B) revenue derived from such facility normally equals or exceeds the
direct operating costs of such facility.” 108 If an employee is permitted to
exclude the value of the meal under Section 119, then the “value of a meal
provided at an ‘eating facility’ will be treated as having paid an amount
equal to the facility’s direct operating cost attributable to the meal.” 109 In
other words, if the consumer of the meal is not required to include the
value of the meal in his gross income, then the consumer will be treated
as if he paid a value for the meal that is equal to the costs the employer
incurred in operating the eating facility. This requirement will be
discussed in further detail in the next section of this note under Section
119.
Neither the Tax Code nor the Treasury Regulations provide a
definition of what constitutes an “eating facility.” 110 However, a Chief
Counsel Advice Memoranda does give some insight into what constitutes
an eating facility under Section 132(e)(2).111 The Office of Chief Counsel
held that crewmembers of a commercial airline could not exclude the cost
of the meals provided to them while in flight from their gross income
under Section 132(e) because the airplane does not constitute an eating
106

I.R.C. § 274(n)(2)(B).
26 I.R.C. § 132(a)(4) (2016) (Section 132(e) provides that the term de minimis fringe
means “any property or service the value of which is (after taking into account the frequency
with which similar fringes are provided by the employer to the employer’s employees) so
small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or administratively impracticable.”).
108
I.R.C. § 132(e).
109
Velarde, supra note 7, at 2.
110
Velarde, supra note 7, at 2.
111
Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2011-51-020 (Aug. 31, 2011); see generally Treas. Reg. §
1.132-7(b)(2)(ii) (2016) (“The cost of labor for personnel whose service relating to the facility
are performed primarily on the premises of the eating facility . . . the labor costs attributable
to cooks, waiters, and waitresses are included in direct operating costs, but the labor costs
attributable to a manager of an eating facility whose services relating to the facility are not
primarily performed on the premises of the earing facility is not included in the direct
operating costs.”).
107
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facility pursuant to Section 132(e)(2).112 Eating facility, according to the
Office of Chief Counsel, “means an identifiable location that is
designated for the preparation and/or consumption of meals,” such as a
cafeteria or dining room.113 Furthermore, the Treasury Regulations
“contemplate that an eating facility is a location at which individuals are
employed to prepare and/or serve food.”114 The hotels where the team
stays satisfy the Office of Chief Counsel and the Regulation’s definition
of eating facility because the team contracts with the away city hotel to
provide an identifiable place where the meals will be provided, and the
team sends a “tightly designed menu” to the hotel’s catering staff to
prepare for the team.115
For an eating facility to qualify as an “employer-operated eating
facility” under Section 132, the Code requires that it be “located on or
near the business premises of the employer” and that the revenue from
the facility equals or exceeds the operating costs of the facility.116 The
Regulations provide four additional conditions:
(i) [t]he facility is owned or leased by the employer, (ii) [t]he
facility is operated by the employer, (iii) [t]he facility is
located on or near the business premises of the employer, and
(iv) [t]he meals furnished at the facility are provided during,
or immediately before or after, the employee’s work day. 117
In section (III)(B)(2)(ii), this note will discuss the Section 132
requirement that the facility be located on or near the business premises
of the employer and the meaning of “business premises” under 274(e)(1).
With respect to the first element required by the Treasury Regulations,
the Boston Bruins should be able to establish that the team leases the
hotel’s eating facility. When the Boston Bruins travel for away games,
the team enters into a formal memorialized letter “or other agreement
with each hotel” which enables the Bruins to establish “a base of
operations at a local hotel.”118 Pursuant to this agreement, the Boston
Bruins pay the hotel an agreed upon amount in exchange for extensive
use of the hotel space.119 Moreover, the Boston Bruins enter into a
contract with “each away city hotel for the provision of a space where the
meals will be provided and for the meals themselves.”120 The team also
enters into a contract regarding what food will be served in the dining
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2011-51-020 (Aug. 31, 2011).
Id.
Id.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
26 I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(A)-(B) (2016).
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(2) (2016).
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
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area.121 This “tightly designed menu” is sent to the “hotel catering
service” prior to the teams arrival and “dictates exactly what proteins,
fruits, and vegetables must be available.”122 Moreover, the time spent at
the hotel during this short-term lease is substantial.123 The amount of
business conducted during “60 minutes of ice time” for each game pales
in comparison to the substantial amount of business conducted at the
hotel during the short-term lease.124 The Treasury Regulations further
require that “the facility is operated by the employer.”125 However, the
Regulations allow an employer to enter into an agreement “with another
to operate an eating facility for its employees.”126 Therefore, since the
Boston Bruins enter into a contract with the hotel’s catering service that
explicitly states what food shall be provided to the players, the Boston
Bruins will be able to meet this requirement of the Treasury Regulations.
The final requirement pursuant to the Treasury Regulations provides that
the meal must be served at the facility “during, or immediately before or
after, the employee’s work day.”127 Once again, the Boston Bruins will
be able to meet this requirement with ease. During the pregame meals,
the players are required to speak with coaches and the media about the
upcoming game.128 Furthermore, the coaches “hold a roll call at meals to
ensure that all the players are in attendance, ready to participate in any
meetings, and ready to head to the arena on time.”129 Immediately after
eating and meeting with the coaches to discuss the game plan, the
“players are taken to the visiting arena for practice or pre-game
warmups.”130 Since the meals are provided right before the team heads
to the away arena, the Boston Bruins will be able to meet the last
requirement of the Treasury Regulations.
B. Section 119
To avoid the fifty percent limitation on deductions for meal
expenses, IRC Section 132(e) requires that the employees be able to
exclude the value of the meals from their income under Section 119.131

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7.
Treas. Reg. § 1.132-7(a)(2)(ii) (2016).
Treas. Reg. § 1.232-7(a)(3).
Treas. Reg. § 1.232-7(a)(2)(iv).
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
I.R.C. § 132(e)(2)(B) (2016).

ADAM SUCKNO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

I.R.S. v. BOSTON BRUINS

8/30/2017 12:18 PM

225

i. Historical Overview
Congress enacted Section 119 to “end the confusion as to the tax
status of meals and lodging furnished to an employee by his employer.” 132
This confusion resulted from the courts and the IRS asserting different
views of when lodging or meals provided by an employer to an employee
should be includible to the employee’s gross income.133 Most of the
confusion regarding when a situation constitutes the convenience of the
employer has subsided; however, there is still considerable confusion
about what constitutes the business premise of the employer. 134 The
confusion that persists today can be traced back to the legislative history
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1964. Originally, the House provided
that “[u]nder Section 119, if meals or lodging (1) are furnished at the
place of employment, and (2) are required to be accepted by the employee
at the place of employment, the value thereof shall be excluded from
gross income . . . .” 135 However, once the Senate received the bill, the
Senate amended critical terms of the bill.136
The House bill provided that there shall be excluded from the gross
income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished by
the employer . . . but only if such meals or lodging are furnished at the
place of employment . . . The Senate amendment provides that meals or
lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer are excluded, but
only if (1) such meals are furnished on the business premises of the
employer . . . The term ‘business premises of the employer’ is intended
in general, to have the same effect as the term ‘place of employment’ in
the House bill. For example, lodging furnished in the home to a domestic
servant would be considered lodging furnished on the business premises
of the employer. Similarly, meals furnished to a cowhand while herding
his employer’s cattle on leased lands, or on national forest lands used
under a permit, would also be regarded as furnished on the business
premises of the employer.137
This slight change in words from “place of employment” to
“business premise of employer” serves as the foundation of the
disagreement between the IRS and the Boston Bruins.138

132
133
134
135
136
137
138

S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 19 (1954).
See generally id.; H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A39 (1954).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (2015); see infra Part IV.B.2.ii.
H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A39 (1954) (emphasis added).
See generally S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 19 (1954).
H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, at 26 (1954) (Conf. Rep.).
Velarde, supra note 7.
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ii. Application and Analysis of Section 119
a. Convenience of the Employer
As mentioned above, the Boston Bruins are allowed to deduct 100
percent of the cost of meals under IRC Section 274(n)(2) only if the meal
expense is a de minimis fringe under Section 132(e).139 Furthermore,
Section 132(e) requires that the cost of operating the eating facility equals
the revenue generated by it, which will be satisfied if the employee can
exclude the value of the meal from his gross income under Section 119.140
Pursuant to Treasury Regulation Section 1.119(a), an employee may
exclude the value of the meal provided by the employer from his gross
income if the meal is furnished “on behalf of his employer for the
convenience of the employer” and “on the business premises of the
employer.”141
Treasury Regulation Section 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) provides that for
meals, the convenience of the employer test will be met if the meals are
furnished in kind for a “substantial noncompensatory business reason.”142
Moreover, the determination of the reason why the employer is providing
meals will not be satisfied by the “mere declaration that the meals are
furnished for the convenience of the employer.”143 Rather, the
determination will be strictly based “upon an examination of all the
surrounding facts and circumstances.”144 The Treasury Regulations do
provide some general examples of when a meal will constitute for the
convenience of the employer, such as when the employee needs to be
available for emergencies, when the employee only has a short time
period to eat because of the nature of his employers business, and when
there are a lack of eating facilities available to the employee. 145
There has been a considerable relaxation in the interpretation of the
convenience of the employer test by the courts, which is illustrated by the
Tax Court’s decision in Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Commissioner and the
subsequent reversal by the Ninth Circuit. In Boyd Gaming Corp., the
petitioners operated a casino where they provided food in their cafeteria
to their employees without a charge.146 The petitioners took the same
position as the Boston Bruins, asserting that they should be able to deduct
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

26 I.R.C. § 274(n)(2) (2016).
26 I.R.C. § 132(e) (2016).
26 I.R.C. § 119(a) (2016).
Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (2016).
Id.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(ii)(a)-(c) (2016).
Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r., 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 759, at *3 (1997).
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100 percent of the meals as a de minimis fringe under Section
274(n)(2).147 The issue in this case was whether the meals were provided
for the convenience of the employer. During the course of this case, the
petitioners argued that they met the convenience of the employer test
because of their “stay on the premise” policy, which required their
employees to remain on the business premises during working hours for
security reasons.148 The Tax Court was not convinced that this policy
was sufficient to meet the convenience of the employer test.149 In coming
to this conclusion, the Court reasoned that there has to be a closer nexus
between “the necessities of the employer’s business and the furnishing of
free meals.”150 Essentially, the Tax Court took a business necessity
theory approach to the convenience of the employer test, which allows an
exclusion of the value of a meal from gross income only “when the
employee must accept the meal ‘in order properly to perform his
duties.’”151
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit took a different position on the
convenience of the employer test. The Ninth Circuit held that a genuine
policy that is enforced by the employer is sufficient to qualify as a
substantially noncompensatory reason under the convenience of the
employer test.152 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the “captive”
employees “had no choice but to eat on the premises” and “the furnished
meals here were, in effect, ‘indispensable to the proper discharge’ of the
employees’ duties.”153
The IRS acquiesced in this decision.154
Furthermore, the IRS stated that it “will not attempt to substitute its
judgment for the business decisions of an employer as to what specific
business policies and practices are best suited to addressing the
employer’s business concerns.”155 However, the IRS added that in
determining if a meal was provided for the convenience of the employer,
it would consider “whether the policies decided upon by the employer are
reasonably related to the needs of the employer’s business . . . and
whether these policies are in fact followed in the actual conduct of
business.”156
In light of this interpretation, the Boston Bruins will be able to
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at *16.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *26.
Id.
Boyd Gaming Corp. v. Comm’r., 177 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1101.
Id.
I.R.S. Announcement 99-77, 1999-32 I.R.B. 3 (Aug. 9, 1999).
Id. at 2.
Id.
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satisfy the convenience of the employer test. The Boston Bruins have
two reasons for providing players with mandatory meals prior to an away
game and neither of these justifications has a compensatory business
reason. First, the mandatory meals allow the team to have complete
control over the players prior to the game.157 The team can control
exactly what the player is putting into his body to ensure that he is able
to perform at his highest level.158 Moreover, the mandatory meals allow
the team to control the “players’ movement and conduct up until the
game.”159 To accomplish this, the coaches take attendance at the meals
to ensure that the players are present, “ready to participate in any
meetings, and ready to head to the arena on time—or simply to ensure
that the players are not absent shortly before a game.”160 Secondly, the
pregame meals allow for coaches to hold meetings with individual
players to ensure that they are all on the same page at the start of the
game.161 It seems unlikely that the court would find that the Boston
Bruins’ policies are not reasonably related to its business needs. The only
reason for these strict policies is to ensure that the team gives the fans a
suitable product on game day. Furthermore, there does not seem to be
any evidence that the team does not follow its policies in the actual
conduct of business. In conclusion, the Boston Bruins have a bona fide
policy in place that is strictly enforced, and thus the court should respect
this business decision by the Boston Bruins and not substitute the team’s
judgment with its own.
b. Business Premises of the Employer
This section will provide a working definition of the term “business
premises of the employer” under IRC Sections 274(e)(1), 132(e)(2), and
119(a)(1).162 As discussed in section 4.B.1 of this note, the language of
Section 119 was changed in the Senate from “furnished at the place of

Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
159
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
160
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
161
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 8.
162
26 I.R.C. § 274(e)(1) (2016) (“Subsection (a) shall not apply to—Expenses for food
and beverages . . . furnished on the business premises of the taxpayer primarily for his
employees.”) (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 132(e)(2) (“The operation by an employer of any
eating facility for employees shall be treated as de minimis fringe if—(A) such facility is
located on or near the business premises of the employer . . . .”) (emphasis added); I.R.C. §
119(a) (“There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals
or lodging furnished to him . . . by . . . his employer for the convenience of the employer, but
only if—(1) . . . meals are furnished on the business premise of the employer . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
157
158

ADAM SUCKNO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

I.R.S. v. BOSTON BRUINS

8/30/2017 12:18 PM

229

employment” to “furnished on the business premise of the employer.”163
Despite the change in the language, the Senate provided that business
premise of the employer is “intended in general, to have the same effect
as the term ‘place of employment.’”164 The Senate further clarified its
position by providing an example of what would constitute the business
premises of the employer.165
The Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide concrete factors
for courts to consider in deciding whether property constitutes the
business premises of the employer in Commissioner v. Kowalski. The
issue was whether the cash meal allowances provided to New Jersey state
troopers should be included in the state troopers’ gross income, or
whether the payment is excluded from the state troopers’ income by
virtue of Section 119.166 State troopers, in this case, were provided meal
allowances by their employer, enabling the troopers to be “on call” while
they were on break.167 Moreover, the state troopers were not required to
spend this money on food, and the amount of money they received for
meals was determined by their rank.168 These factors led the court to hold
in favor of the IRS, reasoning that the payments were part of the state
troopers’ gross income and that Section 119 applies only to “meals or
lodging furnished in kind.”169 Unfortunately, the Court did not address
the question of whether the restaurants that the state troopers ate at satisfy
the business premises requirement of Section 119. However, in a dissent,
Justice Blackmun asserted, “[T]he business premises of the State of New
Jersey, the trooper’s employer, are wherever the trooper is on duty in that
State. The employer’s premises are statewide.”170
In deriving a working definition of “business premises of the
employer,” the Sixth Circuit has applied a two-part test. If the taxpayer
meets either one of these elements, the property will be found to be the
business premises of the employer. The first element is a spatial test,
which states that the business premise of the employer is “the premises
where the employer conducts a significant portion of his business,” even

163

H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at A39 (1954) (emphasis added); see H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543,
at 26 (1954) (Conf. Rep.).
164
H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, at 27 (1954) (Conf. Rep.).
165
Id. (“Meals furnished to a cowhand while herding his employer’s cattle on leased
lands, or on national forest lands used under a permit, would also be regarded as furnished on
the business premises of the employer.”).
166
Comm’r. v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 78 (1977).
167
Id. at 80.
168
Id. at 80-81.
169
Id. at 84 (citing S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 190 (1954)).
170
Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 97-98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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if the employee does not perform any of his duties at this location.171 The
second element is a functional test, which requires that meals or lodging
be provided at “a place where the employee performs a significant portion
of his duties,” even if it is not at the location where the employer conducts
his business operations.172 The Tax Court has applied a “substantially
similar” test for determining the business premises of the employer. This
test holds that the phrase “business premises of the employer” should be
construed to mean either “(1) an integral part of the business property or
(2) premises on which the company carries on some of its business
activities.”173 A location will be considered an integral part of the
business property if “physically located on the employer’s premises” or
if the “employee does enough work for the employer” at the location that
such location is “identified with the interest of the business and serve[s]
important business functions.”174 Conversely, an area “physically located
off the worksite [is] not integral to the employer’s business unless the
employee does significant work for the employer or the employer
conducts a significant portion of its business” in the area.175 Regardless
of which version of the test is applied, the business premises of the
employer is a factual question which considers “[t]he extent or
boundaries of the business premises . . . whose resolution follows a
consideration of the employee’s duties as well as the nature of the
employer’s business.”176 Lastly, the employer’s ownership of the place
where lodging is provided or where meals are furnished “is not intended
by Congress to be the crucial test, nor even an essential element, of the
meaning of ‘business premises.’”177
1. Spatial Business Premises
This section of the note will analyze various court cases where the
spatial location of the property was a determinative factor in deciding
whether or not the property can be considered the business premises of
the employer. In Commissioner v. Anderson, an employer built a house
for his motel manager that was only two blocks from the motel he
managed.178 The manager was required to be available “twenty-four

Comm’r. v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 67 (6th Cir. 1966).
Id.
173
Benninghoff v. Comm’r., 71 T.C. 216, 220 (1978) (citing Dole v. Comm’r., 43 T.C.
697, 707 (1965)).
174
Hargrove v. Comm’r., 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 90, at *4 (2006).
175
Id.
176
Van Huff v. Comm’r., 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 764, at *3-4 (1981).
177
Anderson, 371 F.2d at 64.
178
Id. at 61-62.
171
172
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hours a day for the business of the motel.”179 Here the Court adopted the
rule that “on the business premises of the employer” means that the meals
or lodging must be furnished “at a place where the employee performs a
significant portion of his duties or on the premises where the employer
conducts a significant portion of his business.”180 In the end, the Court
held that the house was not on the business premises of the employer. 181
It reasoned that “[t]o make ‘two short blocks’ or nearness to other
business property of the employer the test is to disregard the word ‘on’ as
contained in the phrase ‘on the business premises of the employer.’” 182
Furthermore, the Court stated that if Congress had intended “on the
business premises of the employer” to mean “near,” it would have used
words such as “‘in the vicinity of’ or ‘nearby’ or ‘close to’ or ‘contiguous
to’ or similar language, rather than to say ‘on’ the business premises.”183
Anderson is similar to Lindeman v. Commissioner such that in
Lindeman, the petitioner was the manager of a hotel and, pursuant to his
employment, his employer provided him with a home in a parking lot
leased by the employer, which was across the street from the hotel.184 As
manager of the hotel, the petitioner was required to be on call twenty-four
hours a day.185 Moreover, the petitioner had a telephone in his home,
which connected directly to the hotel, so that he could conduct business
from home.186 The Court provided that in order for the petitioner’s home
to constitute the business premises of his employer, the petitioner needed
to show that the home was either (1) an “integral part of the business
property or (2) premises on which the company carries on some of its
business activities.”187 Applying this rule to the facts, the Court
concluded that the petitioner’s home was part of the business premises of
the employer, because the lot was owned by the employer. 188
In Winchell v. United States, the petitioner was hired as president of
a college.189 The Board of Directors insisted that the petitioner move into
a home owned by the school, which was located four miles from the main
campus of the school.190 Moreover, the petitioner was permitted to live
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id.
Anderson, 371 F.2d at 67.
Id.
Lindeman v. Comm’r., 60 T.C. 609, 609-12 (1973).
Id. at 616.
Id.
Id. at 615.
Id. at 617.
Winchell v. U.S., 564 F. Supp. 131, 133 (1983).
Id.
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in this home without having to pay rent to the school.191 Occasionally,
the school used the petitioner’s residence for events such as outdoor
classes, student picnics, athletic events, and “college commencement
exercises.”192 The Court concluded that the housing provided by the
school “is not geographically integrated with the business property of the
College.”193 In addition, the Court noted that neither the petitioner nor
his employer carried out a significant portion of their activities or duties
at the residence.194
The aforementioned cases were decided on the proximity of the
property in relation to the business, which was an influential factor in the
courts’ decisions because the petitioners could not establish that they
performed a significant portion of their duties on the properties. If the
petitioners in the aforementioned cases established that they performed a
significant portion of their duties on the properties, then they would have
been able to make a “functional business premises” claim. Moreover, the
majority of courts seem to favor the idea that “functional rather than
spatial unity is determinative” in deciding if an area constitutes part of
the employer’s premises.195
2. Functional Business Premises
In U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce v. United States, the plaintiff
was a nonprofit corporation, which set out to “promote and foster the
growth of young men.”196 The plaintiff provided rent-free housing in
Tulsa, Oklahoma to the president of the organization during his term. 197
During the year, the president spent half of his time traveling and the
other half in Tulsa “directing Plaintiff’s various programs.”198 The house
provided to the president included an office, which he used for
“conducting staff meetings,” “briefings by subordinate officials,” and
providing entertainment for the plaintiff’s business.199 The Court focused
on where the duties of the employee were performed to determine the
business premises of the employer.200 The Court concluded that “part of
plaintiff’s official activities were carried out at the House which it
191

Id.
Id.
193
Id. at 136.
194
Id. at 136–37.
195
Bob Jones University v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 340, 355 (1982) (citing Adams v. United
States, 218 Ct. Cl. 322, 332 (1978)).
196
U.S. Junior Chamber of Commerce v. U.S., 167 Ct. Cl. 392, 394 (1964).
197
Id. at 395.
198
Id. at 395-96.
199
Id. at 396
200
Id. at 400.
192
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owned” and therefore the residence constituted the business premises of
the employer.201
In Adams v. United States, the plaintiff was the president of Mobil
Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaiasha.202 The plaintiff was provided rent-free living
in a house located three miles from his business headquarters. 203 The
plaintiff’s company had a policy of providing its president with housing
because, in Japan, the “effectiveness of a president of a company is
influenced by the social standing.”204 The plaintiff regularly “worked in
the house in the evenings and on weekends,” “held small meetings there
for mixed business and social purposes,” provided business
entertainment, and used the telephone in the house for business
purposes.205 Focusing on the duties performed by the plaintiff, the Court
held that the residence constituted the business premises of the
employer.206
An essential case to the Bruins’ argument is Mabley v.
Commissioner. The issue in this case was whether the petitioner may
exclude from gross income, under Section 119, “the fair market value of
meals furnished to him by his employer during that year.” 207 During the
1960 tax year, the Petitioner was the vice president of Island Creek Coal
Company, which was located in the Chafin Building.208 The president of
the company had a policy that he would hold “daily luncheon conferences
with his staff,” which included the executive vice president, several vice
presidents, and general counsel.209 These daily lunch meetings allowed
the staff members to report on their various departments and disclose any
new information that had arisen since the prior meeting, enabling the
president and the staff to stay informed on the current day-to-day
activities of the company.210 In order to effectuate the president’s lunch
meeting policy, the company needed to provide meals to the staff;
however, “there were no dining facilities in the Chafin Building, with the
exception of a stand-up snack bar which would accommodate only a few
people.”211
The lack of dining facilities prompted the company to enter into a
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211

Id.
Adams v. U.S., 218 Ct. Cl. 322, 324 (1978).
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id. at 326.
Id. at 333-34.
Mabley v. C.I.R., 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784, at *1 (1965).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id.
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rental agreement with the owner of the Prichard Hotel, which was
“located approximately one-half block from the Chafin Building.”212
Pursuant to the agreement, the company paid the Prichard Hotel for a
suite “suitable for dining purposes.”213 Furthermore, the rental agreement
provided that the hotel would “provide the company meals from the hotel
kitchen” during the meetings, which were served in the suite, and the
meals would paid for by the company.214 Sometimes these daily lunch
meetings were attended by “out-of-town business guests of the company”
and occasionally “the suite was used to provide dinner for such guests.”215
The petitioner in Mabley was determined by the IRS to have a deficiency
in income because the gross income on the petitioner’s tax return omitted
the fair market value of these daily meals. 216 However, the Court held
that, in light of the aforementioned facts, the leased hotel suite constituted
the business premises of the employer.217 The Court reasoned that “the
rented hotel suite in which the meals were furnished was acquired and
actually used for the conduct of businesses of the company, the furnishing
of the meals being merely incidental.”218 Thus, even though the hotel
was not located on the business premises of the employer, the Court
found that the employees conducted a significant amount of business at
the hotel, which enabled it to be considered the business premises of the
employer for Section 119 purposes.
Lastly, in a Revenue Ruling, the IRS provided an example of when
a location is considered a business premise of the employer by virtue of
the employer performing substantial work at the location.219 The
situation presented to the IRS involved a bank that had several branch
offices and a main office in a city. 220 The main office and some of the
branch offices furnished meals free of charge to the employees of the
company.221 However, some of the branches did not have an eating
facility, which caused the employees of those branches to go to the main
office or one of the other branches that had a dining facility for lunch.
The IRS held that the employees who “work in a branch office having no
Id. at *1 (The Prichard Hotel was “the nearest hotel that had dining facilities.”).
Mabley v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1794 (1965).
214
Id. at *2 (“At daily luncheons conferences each staff member ordered from the regular
hotel menu.”).
215
Id. at *2 (stating that there were also times where a business meeting would occur in
the suite and no meals were served).
216
Id. at *2.
217
Id. at *3.
218
Id.
219
Rev. Rul. 77-411, 1971-2 C.B. 103.
220
Id.
221
Id.
212
213
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eating facilities but who go to a branch that has eating facilities are
considered to have received their meals on the premises of their
employer,” because “a significant portion of the employer’s business is
carried on at the place where the employees receive the meals.”222
Under the functional view, the courts have varied in the amount of
work that needs to be conducted by the employer or the employee in order
to convert a property into the business premises of the employer. In
Adams, the Court required that there be “some substantial segment” of
business activity to have the property be classified as the business
premises of the employer.223 Other courts, such as the one in Anderson,
require that a “significant portion” of the employer’s or employee’s duties
occur at a location in order to convert that location into the business
premises of the employer.224 However, a few courts, such as the court in
Dole v. Commissioner, require that only “some” business activities occur
on the property in order for a property to be considered the business
premises of the employer.225
3. Business Premises of the Boston Bruins
As previously discussed, the business premises of the employer is
either “the premises where the employer conducts a significant portion of
his business,” even if the employee does not perform any of his duties at
this location, or “a place where the employee performs a significant
portion of his duties,” even if it is not at the location where the employer
conducts his business operations.226 Moreover, “functional rather than
spatial unity is determinative” in deciding if an area constitutes the
employer’s premises.227
The Boston Bruins will be able to satisfy either one of these tests
when the team travels for away games. With respect to the premises
where the employee performs a significant amount of his duties, the
Boston Bruins’ players perform a significant amount of their duties at the
hotel in the away city. During the players’ stay at the hotel, they are
required to attend meetings where they “go over the game plan” and
watch film on their opponent.228 If players miss any of these meetings or
if they miss a curfew, the team reserves the right to fine the players for

222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id.
Adams v. U.S., 218 Ct. Cl., 332, 332 (1978).
Comm’r. v. Anderson, 371 F.2d 59, 65 (6th Cir. 1966).
Dole v. Comm’r., 43 T.C. 697, 707 (1965).
Anderson, 371 F.2d at 67.
Bob Jones University v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 340, 355 (1982).
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7.
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failure to abide by the team’s rules.229 The time the players spend
preparing for the games in the hotel “is substantial, and far greater than
the 60 minutes of ice time that each away game requires.”230
Furthermore, the players receive all necessary medical treatment and
physical therapy while staying at the hotel.231 An analogous situation to
the Boston Bruins’ case is provided by the legislative history of IRC
Section 119: the Senate provided that “meals furnished to a cowhand
while herding his employer’s cattle on leased lands, or on national forest
lands used under a permit, would also be regarded as furnished on the
business premises of the employer.”232 Essentially, the players are the
cowhands and the hotel is the land leased, pursuant to a short-time lease,
by their employer. This example provided by the legislative history
makes it clear that the Boston Bruins should be able to exclude its players’
meals from its gross income.
In regards to the second test where the business premises is the
property where the employer performs a significant amount of his
business, the Boston Bruins will be able to satisfy this test. When
traveling to an away city, the Boston Bruins set up a “base of operations
at a local hotel.”233 This hotel is used extensively by the team to further
its business purposes.234 For instance, the team requires the hotel to
provide “private meeting rooms,” “eating facilities,” and “space for
physical therapy and medical treatment.”235 The Boston Bruins’ situation
is similar to that in Mabley. Both Mabley and the Boston Bruins conduct
business at a hotel, which is leased or rented by the company. 236
Furthermore, in both of these cases, the location of the property where
the business meeting is held is not at the main headquarters of the
company.237 The only difference between these two cases is the amount
of time that the company has rights to the property and the distance of the
property with respect to the headquarters of the business.238 In Mabley,
the hotel where the business meetings were held was only one and a half

Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 7.
231
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
232
H.R. REP. NO. 83-2543, at 26 (1954) (Conf. Rep.).
233
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6.
234
Br. for Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6-7.
235
Br. For Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6-7.
236
See generally Mabley v. Comm’r., 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784 (1965); see also Br. for
Pet’r, supra note 1, at 6-7.
237
See generally Mabley, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784 (1965); see also Br. for Pet’r, supra
note 1, at 6-7.
238
See generally Mabley, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784 (1965); see generally Br. for Pet’r,
supra note 1.
229
230
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blocks from the offices of the company, and the company used the hotel
on a daily basis.239 But the location of the Boston Bruins’ hotel could be
anywhere where there is a professional hockey team, and the team will
likely stay at the hotel for a only few days. However, the distance of the
property from the main offices should not matter because “functional
rather than spatial unity is determinative” in deciding if an area
constitutes the employer’s premises.240 Additionally, the amount of time
that a property has to be used by the employer or employee has not been
considered a determinative factor for the business premises test. In light
of the aforementioned, the Boston Bruins will be able to establish that the
hotel is functionally its business premise.
V. CONCLUSION
The Boston Bruins should be entitled to deduct 100 percent of the
away game meal expenses that the team incurs. As mentioned above, the
team is able to satisfy all the requirements of Tax Code Sections 162, 274,
and 132. The most difficult issue for the team is establishing that the
away city hotel constitutes its business premises. However, the
legislative history and case law strongly indicate that the team will be
able to meet this burden.
The implications of the Boston Bruins winning this case are
immense. If the court finds in favor of the Boston Bruins, the IRS will
lose out on millions of dollars from all major sports teams in the United
States. A favorable ruling for the Boston Bruins would essentially
encourage professional sports teams to provide their players with meals
during away games because the teams would be able to fully deduct the
amount spent on the meals. Moreover, the IRS risks losing tax revenue
from “industries involving mobile employers” because those industries
will use this case as precedent.241

239
240
241

Mabley, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1784, at *1-2 (1965).
Bob Jones University v. U.S., 229 Ct. Cl. 340, 355 (1982).
Velarde, supra note 7.

